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The verdicts standard consequentialism gives about what we are obli-
gated to do crucially depend on what theory of value the consequentialist
accepts. This makes it hard to say what separates standard consequen-
tialist theories from non-consequentialist theories. This article discusses
how we can draw sharp lines separating standard consequentialist theo-
ries from other theories and what assumptions about goodness we must
make in order to draw these lines. The discussion touches on cases of
deontic constraints, cases of deontic options, and cases involved in the so-
called “actualism”/“possibilism” debate. What emerges is that there are
various interesting patterns relating the different commitments of conse-
quentialism, different principles about obligation and about goodness, and
different rules concerning how facts about values determine facts about
obligation.
Keywords: constraints, options, actualism, possibilism, consequentializing, axi-
ology, deontic logic, decision rules
Introduction
When we introduce students to moral philosophy, we draw sharp contrasts between
different ethical theories. Chief among these contrasts is the contrast between conse-
quentialism and non-consequentialist moral theories. We often illustrate the contrast
with cases like the Williams’s integrity challenges (Williams 1973) and Foot’s Trolley
Problem (Foot 1967 [1979]).
But the contemporary literature about moral philosophy does not fit well with this
tidy picture. As the articles in this handbook attest, consequentialism is a label for a
startling variety of different theories that can often make different predictions about
these cases. Indeed, some have gone so far as to argue that consequentialism is such
an accommodating framework that it can deliver the same verdicts as any plausible
non-consequentialist theory.1 This is because, these theorists argue, there is always
∗Thanks to Doug Portmore for comments and discussion.
1Important proponents of the approach include Dreier 1993, Dreier 2011, Louise 2004,
Oddie and Milne 1991, Portmore 2007, Portmore 2009. Important criticisms include Brown
2011, Schroeder 2007. An important recent work that is relevant to this discussion but harder
to categorize is Dietrich and List 2017.
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some ranking of outcomes according to their goodness that can deliver whatever result
about a case that we wish.
This article investigates to what extent we can draw lines that separate standard
consequentialist theories from other theories. In my usage, a fault line is a case or
really a structural description of a class of cases that can be used to separate moral
theories because the theories give different verdicts about the class of cases. I will be
interested in what fault lines there are and in the closely related question of how to
establish that these fault lines exist.
We begin by exploring two of the most studied kinds of cases that are supposed
to separate consequentialist theories from deontological theories, cases of deontic con-
straints and cases of deontic options (§1). We then discuss another family of fault lines
that can be described using certain simple abstract principles (§2). These fault lines
separate standard consequentialist theories from certain non-consequentialist theories
that nonetheless give the value of outcomes an important place in determining the
deontic status of acts (§3). Finally, we close by commenting on how our discussion
bears on broader issues in ethical theory (§4).
1 Deontic Constraints and Options
Cases of deontic constraint come in a variety of forms.2 Here is a simple case:
Mac faces a choice of whether or not to murder an innocent person, Jack.
If Mac does not murder Jack, Frank and Hank will each murder a different
innocent person. If Mac does murder Jack, he will prevent Frank and Hank
from murdering.
Many believe that it would be wrong for Mac to murder Jack even though Mac’s
murdering Jack would prevent Frank and Hank from murdering two innocent people.
Many non-consequentialist theories give this result about the case. On the other hand,
it is hard to see how standard act consequentialism—–S is obligated to do x iff the
outcome of S’s doing x is better than the outcome of S’s refraining from doing x—can
get this result.3 Given that the outcome of Mac’s murdering Jack contains just one
innocent person being murder and given that the outcome of Mac’s refraining from
murdering Jack contain two innocent murders, it seems that the outcome of Mac’s
murdering Jack is better than the outcome of Mac’s refraining from murdering Jack.
Thus, standard act consequentialism appears to be committed to the idea that Mac is
obligated to murder.
And cases like Mac’s are just one of a class of structurally similar cases that raise
similar problems such as the following kinds of cases:
• cases where an agent can break a promise in order to prevent others from break-
ing their promises
• cases where an agent can forgo providing a benefit for one of her nearest-and-
dearest in order to prevent others from forgoing providing a benefit for one of
their nearest-and-dearest
2These cases are sometimes called cases of agent-centered restrictions and are taken to
show that consequentialism only allows agent-neutral considerations to be relevant. The
classic discussion in this vein is perhaps Scheffler 2003 [1982] (see also Darwall 1986 which,
among other things, provides a useful historical and conceptual background for understanding
these cases).
3I stipulate that S’s refraining from doing x is S not doing x.
2
One standard gloss on what the structural similarity between these cases are is that
they are cases where an agent faces a choice of whether to perform an act where
performing that act will prevent others from performing an act of the same morally
relevant type. According to some non-consequentialist theories, there are cases where
it is wrong for an agent to perform an act (e.g., murder, break a promise) even though
doing so would prevent others from performing an act of the same morally relevant
type (e.g., murder, break a promise). But according to standard consequentialism it
appears there can be no such cases.
Cases of deontic options, like cases of deontic constraints, come in a variety of
forms. Here is a simple case of this sort:
Carol works for a non-profit helping the global poor. She works directly
with those affected by poverty and is passionate about it. She could quit
her job and work in finance and donate all her money to charity. She
would help slightly more people by donating money rather than working
directly with the global poor.
Many people believe that it is permissible for Carol to continue working for the non-
profit and permissible for her to work in finance. Standard consequentialism, on
the other hand, appears to entail that Carol is required to quit her job and work in
finance because this will help slightly more people. Many non-consequentialist theories
recognize a special dispensation permitting an agent to pursue the projects that matter
the most to her, but standard consequentialism is accused of being incompatible with
this.
1.1 Dimensions of Importance
Suppose that it has been shown that consequentialist and non-consequentialist theories
are committed to giving different results about cases of deontic constraints and cases
of deontic options. These cases then would be fault lines that separate these theories.
Can anything more be said about these fault lines?
One way to think about these questions is to ask whether the fault lines target
only some of the core commitments of consequentialism or all of them. There are at
least three core commitments of consequentialism. The first two are the commitments
we get from separating the biconditional that is the statement of consequentialism into
a pair of conditionals:
Left-to-Right: if S is obligated to do x, then the outcome of S’s doing
x is better than the outcome of S’s failing to do x
Right-to-Left: if the outcome of S’s doing x is better than the outcome
of S’s failing to do x, then S is obligated to do x
The third commitment is an entailment of consequentialism that is sometimes called
the “compelling idea”, the idea that it is always permissible to do what is best:
Compelling Idea: if the outcome of S’s doing x is the best outcome, it
is permissible for S to do x
We can now ask the more specific question of what cases of constraints and options
say about each of these theses.
Begin with cases of constraints. If it is true that the outcome of Mac’s murder is
better than the outcome of Mac’s refraining from murder and it is true that Mac is
not obligated to murder and that Mac is obligated to refrain from murder, then cases
of constraints are incompatible with all three theses. To see it is incompatible with
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Left-to-Right consider that Mac is obligated to refrain from murdering even though
the outcome of murdering is better than the outcome of refraining from murdering.
To see that it is incompatible with Right-to-Left and Compelling Idea, consider
that the outcome of Mac murdering is best outcome available to Mac and yet it is not
permissible for Mac to murder. On the other hand, cases of deontic options are only
incompatible with Right-to-Left. In cases of deontic option it is merely permissible
(so not obligatory) for Carol to work in finance even though the outcome of her doing
so is better than the outcome of her not doing so (and dedicating her life to working
at the non-profit). On the other hand, these cases are no threat to Right-to-Left
because no act is obligatory in this case. And these cases pose no threat to Compelling
Idea because the act with the best outcome is permissible.
Thus, there is a sense in which cases of deontic constraints are more deeply in
tension with the consequentialist framework than cases of deontic options. I will,
then, say we can analyze putative fault lines according to how deeply incompatible
with consequentialism they are where one measure of depth is which commitments of
consequentialism must be rejected.
Of course, unlike the ordinary notion of depth, this notion cannot be numerically
measured. Instead, it is better understood as a useful indicator. So though we may
not be able to so precisely compare the depth of fault lines, we can still use adjectives
related to depth as helpful labels that tell us to look more closely at exactly which
commitments are rejected by each fault line.
1.2 Assumptions about Goodness
In order to establish that consequentialism is incompatible with cases of deontic con-
straints and cases of deontic options, we need to make substantive assumptions about
the goodness of outcomes, e.g., that the outcome containing two murders was worse
than the outcome containing one.
And these assumptions are initially quite plausible. But what is to prevent the
consequentialist from rejecting these assumptions in favor of a different account of
goodness? For example, what is to prevent the consequentialist from claiming that
keeping one’s hands clean from murder is better than preventing those who already
have murderous consciences from murdering?
More generally, consequentialist who are pluralists about the good have consider-
able resources to accommodate putative fault lines. Campbell Brown observes that to
those who claim that a certain case is incompatible with consequentialism:
[. . . ] the consequentialist [. . . may] reply. “Your story presupposes a cer-
tain account of what makes consequences better or worse, a certain ‘theory
of the good,’ as we consequentialists like to say. Consequentialism, how-
ever, is not wedded to any such theory. We already knew that combining
consequentialism with some theories of the good would have implausible
results; that’s what utilitarianism has taught us. In order to reconcile con-
sequentialism with the view that this action you’ve described is wrong,
we need only to find an appropriate theory of the good, one according to
which the consequences of this action would not be best. You say you’re
concerned about the guy’s rights? No worries; we’ll just build that into
your theory of the good. Then you can be a consequentialist too.” (Brown
2011: 749-750)
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Of course, there may be arguments against the theory of goodness that consequential-
ism requires to get the desired results in these cases. But there is no easy road from
simple verdicts about cases to the rejection of consequentialism. Additional argument
concerning what is good is needed.
If the strategy that Brown outlines works, it would show that we cannot establish
the existence of fault lines separating consequentialist from non-consequentialist the-
ories while being neutral about what theory of goodness is correct. I call the question
of what it takes to establish a fault line the question of on what grounds the fault line
can be established. And what we have just seen is that there is an interesting question
of whether any fault line can be established on neutral grounds.
This gives us a second dimension of evaluation by which to consider various fault
lines.
1.3 There are No Deep Fault Lines on Neutral Grounds
We have already seen that given certain assumptions about goodness, we can establish
that cases of deontic constraints form a deep fault line. But we have also seen that
these assumptions are substantive. In this subsection, we will see that though some
fault lines can be established on neutral grounds, no deep fault line can be established
on neutral grounds.
1.3.1 A Fault Line on Neutral Grounds
We begin by seeing that we can establish that cases of deontic constraints are in-
compatible with consequentialism on neutral grounds. The only assumptions about
goodness that we will make are standard logical assumptions about the betterness
relation (e.g., that it is irreflexive, transitive, and complete).4
Consider a case where if Mary doesn’t murder, John will and where if John doesn’t
murder, Mary will. Intuitively, this is a case of constraints where it is wrong for Mary
to murder and wrong for John to murder.
But consider that there are only two possible ways things could go:
w1: Mary murders, John doesn’t
w2: Mary doesn’t murder, John does
No matter how these outcomes are ordered with respect to betterness, we must reject
either the claim that it is obligatory for Mary to not murder or the claim that is is
obligatory John to not murder (and not obligatory for them to murder). For suppose
w1 is better than w2, in this case consequentialism entails that it obligatory for Mary
to murder. Analogously, if w2 is better than w1, it follows that it is obligatory for John
to murder. Finally, if w1 and w2 are equally good, it follows that it is not obligatory
for either of them to refrain murder. Thus, it follows that no matter what theory of
goodness we accept consequentialism is incompatible with cases of deontic constraint.
1.3.2 Impossibility and Modesty
That said, this argument does not establish that there is a deep fault line for it is
compatible with Left-to-Right and Compelling Idea. If w1 and w2 are equally
ranked, Left− to − Right must hold because no act is obligatory in such a case and
CompellingIdea must hold because all acts are permissible in such a case. More
4This neutral argument is essentially the one in Brown 2011: 761-3.
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generally, in order to show that either of these theses fails, one outcome must be
ranked ahead of another. This shows that no neutral argument can ever establish a
deep fault line because there is nothing about the logical structure of goodness that
entails that one outcome is strictly better than another.
This teaches us that in order to establish deep fault lines, we will need to appeal to
some substantive principle that tells us one outcome is better than another. But these
principles need not be as strong as the claim that violating rights is bad or donating
to charity is good. Instead, we can rely on modest theoretical principles.
One such principle is a Pareto-like principle that I will call Unanimity
Unanimity: if every agent ought to prefer an outcome wi to another
outcome wj , then wi is better than wj
This is a high-level minimal principle connecting the preferences that every agent ought
to have with goodness.5 Though I do not believe that there is any snappy argument
in favor of this principle, it is quite plausible.
In other work (Nair 2014), I argue that if we accept this principle, we can show that
a certain class of cases of deontic constraints form a deep fault line. Since the principle
is neither a purely logical principle nor a more substantive claim about goodness, I say
we can establish that these cases form a deep fault line on relatively modest (albeit
not neutral) grounds. The argument for this is too lengthy to be rehearsed here.6 And
the details are in any case inessential. But what matters for our purposes is that we
may uncover certain modest principles about value that can be used to establish fault
lines in ethical theory. The next section adopts this approach.
2 Structural Descriptions of Cases and Standard
Consequentialism
As we have seen, typically fault lines are paradigmatic examples (e.g., cases where
common sense morality suggests it is wrong to murder even to prevent more murders)
or specified with informal glosses (e.g., cases where it is wrong to do an act even though
that act would prevents the performance of more acts of the same morally relevant
type). But little work has been done to describe these fault lines formally.
This is understandable as these cases have quite complex normative and causal
structures. Nonetheless, in this section, we will consider how simple formal principles
can specify fault lines.
2.1 The Logical Structure of Cases
We focus on extremely simple cases involving only what an agent at a time is obligated
to do (though these acts may occur at distinct times). We will use O as an obligation
operator take it to be implicitly indexed to an agent at a time. We will also assume that
5Though it abuses language, I treat ‘ought’ and ‘obligatory’ and their variants as synony-
mous throughout this paper.
6Roughly, the argument proceeds by claiming that cases of deontic constraints only arise
when the preferences that agents ought to have differ. A subclass of such cases will be cases
with the structure of a prisoner’s dilemma. In this subclass, the Unanimity principle forces
the “cooperate-cooperate” outcome to be ranked ahead of the “defect-defect” outcome in
such a way that allows us to show that consequentialism is deeply incompatible with cases of
deontic constraints of this structure.
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O officially is a propositional operator rather than an operator on acts themselves. But
often, when speaking informally, we will freely switch between treating the prejacents
of O as propositions or as acts. In this setting, we can write down some simple
sentences and take them to characterize a class of cases. For example, presumably the
sentence ‘O(A) or ¬O(A)’ characterizes every case. And presumably every theory says
‘yes’ to the existence of this class and ‘no’ to the existence to a non-empty complement
of this class. So it does not form a fault line.
But there are other more interesting cases as well. Here is one example:
Agglomeration: O(A) ∧O(B)→ O(A ∧B)
Agglomeration is a structural description of a class of cases in which either O(A)∧
O(B) is false or O(A ∧ B) is true. The complement of this class is the cases where
O(A)∧O(B) is true and O(A∧B) is false. For Agglomeration to specify a fault line
would be for there to be a dispute among theories about whether the class specified by
it or by its complement are non-empty. As we will see, there is such a dispute about
whether the complement of this class of case is non-empty.
In a similar vein, we can ask about the class of cases and complement of the class
of cases characterized by the following principles:
Inheritance: If A entails B, then O(A) entails O(B)
No Conflicts: If O(A1) is true, O(A2) is true, . . . , and O(An) is true,
then {A1, A2, . . . , An} is consistent
No Strict Conflicts:¬(O(A) ∧O(¬A))
Later, we will discuss the plausibility of these principles (§3.5). But for now, we turn to
an initial discussion of how consequentialism as standardly formulated is incompatible
with these principles.
2.2 Standard Consequentialism and the Ubiquity of Fault
Lines
As discussed early, standard act consequentialism is the following claim:
S is obligated to do x iff the outcome of S’s doing x is better than the
outcome of S’s failing to do x
where we say for a possible world, w:
w is the outcome of S’s doing(/refraining from doing) x iff if S were to
do(/refrain from doing) x, then w would obtain7
We will look in greater detail at the features of this formulation in §3.1. But for now,
what I wish to point out is that Agglomeration, Inheritance, and No Conflicts
appear to be fault lines in that standard consequentialism accepts the existence of
cases that falsify these principles while other theories accept these principles so are
committed to there being no such cases.
Many cases in the literature have been offered that attest to standard consequen-
tialism’s rejection of these principles.8 Here we can consider one due to Michael
Zimmerman:
7I stipulate ‘S refrains from doing x’ is equivalent to the sentential negation of ‘S does x’.
8Cases of this sort are discussed in the so-called “actualism/possibilism” debate. See
Timmerman and Cohen, this volume (and the citations therein) for a rich discussion of this
literature. There are many interesting relations between their discussion and what is to follow.
Unfortunately, I am unable to pursue these at this time.
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I have been invited to attend a wedding. The bride-to-be is a former
girlfriend of mine; it was she who did the dumping. Everyone, including
me in my better moments, recognizes that she was quite right to end our
relationship; we were not well suited for one another, and the prospects
were bleak. Her present situation is very different; she and her fiancé
sparkle in one another’s company, spreading joy wherever they go. This
irks me to no end, and I tend to behave badly whenever I see them to-
gether. I ought not to misbehave, of course, and I know this; I could easily
do otherwise, but I do not. The wedding will be an opportunity for me to
put this boorishness behind me, to grow up and move on. The best thing
for me to do would be to accept the invitation, show up on the day in
question, and behave myself. The worst thing would be to show up and
misbehave; better would be to decline the invitation and not show up at
all. (Zimmerman 2006: 153)
Zimmerman adds to fill out the case “if I accepted the invitation, I would show up
and misbehave (whereas I would not do this if I declined). I need not misbehave (for,
as noted, I could easily do otherwise); nonetheless, this is what I would in fact do”
(ibid.: 153).
Here Zimmerman can accept the invitation in two ways. One way would be to
accept the invitation and go on to behave well; the other to accept the invitation
and go on to behave poorly. If he were to accept the invitation, he would go on to
behave poorly. He can, on the other hand, decline the invitation. The best outcome is
the outcome in which Zimmerman accepts and behaves well. The middle outcome is
the outcome in which Zimmerman declines the invitation. The worst outcome is the
outcome in which Zimmerman accepts and behaves poorly. The outcome of accepting
is the outcome in which Zimmerman accepts and behaves poorly.
According to standard consequentialism, Zimmerman is obligated to decline be-
cause the outcome of Zimmerman declining is the middle outcome which is better than
the outcome of Zimmerman not declining (i.e., accepting) which is the worst outcome.
By similar reasoning, it is not the case that Zimmerman is obligated to accept. But
Zimmerman is obligated to accept and behave well because the outcome of this is best.
If we let ‘Accept’ expressed the proposition that Zimmerman accepts the invitation,
‘Behave Well’ express the proposition that Zimmerman behaves well, and ‘Decline’
express the proposition that Zimmerman declines the invitation, we have O(Accept ∧
Behave Well), O(Decline), ¬O(Accept). This falsifies Inheritance. Next, since one
cannot accept, behave well, and decline, this also falsifies No Conflicts.
Finally, we assume throughout an impossible claim is never obligatory.9 So we
have ¬O(Accept ∧ Behave Well ∧Decline). This, then, falsifies Agglomeration as
well. Thus these principles appear to represent a fault lines in ethical theory in that
standard consequentialism cannot accept them and other theories do accept them.10
But do examples like Zimmerman’s rest on substantive assumptions about good-
ness?
9This can be justified by the Kantian idea that one is obligated to do something only if
one can do it or by the assumption that an impossible situation is worse than any possible
situation.
10No Strict Conflicts is something that standard consequentialism accepts. This is
because A cannot have an outcome that is better than the outcome of ¬A while ¬A has a
better outcome than the outcome of A at the same time.
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2.3 Non-Neutral Grounds
To check whether they do, let’s begin by understanding the structure of Zimmerman’s
example: There is an act A (e.g., Accept) that can be done in two incompatible ways,
A ∧ B (e.g., Accept ∧ Behave Well) and A ∧ ¬B (e.g., Accept ∧ ¬Behave Well).11
These acts result in distinct incompatible outcomes, w(A∧B) and w(A∧¬B). Further, we
assumed that there is another act C (e.g., Decline) that has a third distinct outcome,
wC . Finally, we claimed that if one were to do A (e.g., Accept), one would do it some
particular way such as A∧¬B (e.g, Accept∧¬Behave Well). Evidently, these claims
make no assumptions whatsoever about the goodness or badness of outcomes. And
they are, in any case, thoroughly innocuous.
But the case relied on some further assumptions. In particular, I claimed that we
can rank the outcomes so that wC is strictly in the middle (i.e., it is strictly better
than exactly one of w(A∧B) and w(A∧¬B) and strictly worse than exactly one of w(A∧B)
and w(A∧¬B)). In the example, I claimed the outcome of declining the invitation is
strictly better than the outcome of accepting and behaving poorly and strictly worse
than the outcome of accepting and behaving well.
But we already know for the reasons given in §1.3.2 that these assumptions about
goodness must be non-neutral: The assumptions entail that some outcome is ranks
ahead of another outcome. But there is nothing about the minimal structural prop-
erties of goodness that would tell us this. So the argument that standard consequen-
tialism must reject the above principles relies on some substantive assumptions about
goodness.
2.4 Modest Grounds
But what are the weakest assumptions that we actually need to make about goodness
in order to establish this fault line? Or to frame this issue in a different way, is there
a theory of goodness that can we supplement standard consequentialism with so as to
show that it can accept Inheritance, Agglomeration, and No Conflicts?
We already saw that in Zimmerman’s example the act of accepting can be done
in two ways, one can accept and go on to behave well or accept and go on to behave
poorly. And in Zimmerman’s example there was also the act of declining which is
incompatible with all of these acts. The crucial additional value assumption that is
made in Zimmerman’s example is that the value of the outcome of declining can be
strictly in between the value of these two different ways of accepting. It assumes that
we can in fact pry apart the value of two outcomes in which one accepts.
This suggests that if we adopt a theory of goodness that does not allow us to pry
apart the value of two outcomes in which an agent accepts, Zimmerman’s case would
not be enough to establish that consequentialism is incompatible with Inheritance,
Agglomeration, and No Conflicts. More generally, it suggests the conjecture that
if value of the outcomes in which a given act, A, occurs cannot be “splintered” in the
sense that there is an incompatible act B whose outcome is strictly in two distinct
outcomes in which A occurs, then standard consequentialism can accept Inheritance,
Agglomeration, and No Conflicts. This conjecture can be formalized as follows:
Value Non-Splintering: if A is true at wi and at wj , then for any wk
where A is false, if wi is strictly better than (/worse than/equally good
as) wk, then wj is better than (/worse than/equally good as) wk
11Others such as Brown 2018and Portmore 2019: ch. 4 have also thought of this case (or
cases similar to it) as a case where there are multiple versions or ways of doing an act.
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where A is a statement that the agent does some act (e.g, S does x) and where wi,
wj , wk are outcomes.
12 According to this principle, It cannot be that the outcome of
Decline is strictly in between the outcomes of Accept∧Behave Well and the outcome
of Accept ∧ ¬Behave Well. This is because the outcome of Accept ∧ Behave Well
and the outcome of Accept∧¬Behave Well are both outcomes in which Accept holds.
And the principle tells us that no outcome where Accept does not hold can come
strictly between two outcome in which Accept holds. Thus, if this principle holds, we
cannot use Zimmerman’s case to establish that consequentialism is incompatible with
Inheritance, Agglomeration, and No Conflicts.
Of course, it is unsurprising that we get these results in Zimmerman-type cases
as the principle is tailored to handle that case. But our more general conjecture is
also true: Standard consequentialism paired with Value Non-Splintering entails
Inheritance, Agglomeration, and No Conflicts. Proposition 1-Proposition 3 in
§A provide the relevant proofs of the conjecture.
Value Non-Splintering and its negation are non-trivial claims. That said, they
are quite different from the claim, e.g., that protection of rights makes no contribution
to goodness. One obvious difference is its generality.
Another difference is that Value Non-Splintering is quite implausible in its
own right. One way to think about Value Non-Splintering is that it says that for
a given act A the value of A has a kind of lexical priority in ordering outcomes in
which A with respect outcomes in which ¬A. Outcomes in which A may be better or
worse than or equal to one another. But when it comes to comparisons to outcomes
in which ¬A, it is only the presence of A that matters. While this property may be
sensible for certain acts that are especially morally awful or especially morally good,
it is not sensible for every act. Consider ordinary acts such as the act of deciding to
spend time reading a book, going to the movies, or eating dinner. It is implausible
that anything that one can do that results in these acts occurring ranks the same as
any other outcome in which these acts occur. Surely, reading a very good book may
be better than not reading any book which in turn is better than reading a very bad
book. This is something that Value Non-Splintering forbids.
For this reason, then, I believe the rejection of Value Non-Splintering is a very
modest commitment about goodness. And as such, it can be shown on modest grounds
that each of the principles of Agglomeration, Inheritance, and No Conflicts
each form a fault line separating standard consequentialism which must reject all of
these claims from other theories which can accept these claims.
2.5 Depth
How deep is this fault line? First, the fault line does not falsify Compelling Idea
(which recall says that if the outcome of S’s doing x is the best available outcome,
then it is permissible for S to do x). This is because in these cases the act which has
the best outcome (e.g. accepting and behaving) is obligatory and hence is permissible
according to standard consequentialism and according to how cases like Zimmerman’s
are standardly presented.
Whether both Left-to-Right (i.e., if S is obligated to do x, then the outcome of
S’s doing x is better than the outcome of S’s failing to do x) and Right-to-Left (i.e.,
12The qualification that ‘wi, wj , wk are outcomes’ restricts our attention to possible worlds
that would result from some act available to the agent. So the principle does not apply to
possible worlds that could not result from some act available to the agent
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if the outcome of S’s doing x is better than the outcome of S’s failing to do x, then S
is obligated to do x) fail depends on exactly how Value Non-Splintering fails. To
illustrate, suppose in Zimmerman’s case Accept ∧ Behave Well has an outcome that
is strictly better than the outcome of ¬Accept which in turn is strictly better than
the outcome of Accept. This is an instance of the failure of Value Non-Splintering
that has the following structure:
Total Value Splintering: there is an act A such that wi and wj are
outcomes in which A occurs and wk is an outcome in which ¬A occurs
and wi is strictly better than wk and wk is strictly better than wj
In cases, with this structure, both Left-to-Right and Right-to-Left fail.
To see this, suppose Inheritance, Agglomeration, and No Conflicts hold so
that it is obligatory to accept and behave, that it is obligatory to accept, and that
it is not obligatory to decline. Here Left-to-Right fails because it is obligatory to
accept even though the outcome of accepting is not strictly better than the outcome of
declining. And here Right-to-Left fails because the outcome of declining is strictly
better than the outcome of accepting but it is not obligatory to decline.
On the other hand, Value Non-Splintering can fail without Total Value
Splintering holding. For example, suppose we hold that outcome of accepting and
behaving is strictly better than the outcome of declining but then only claim that the
outcome of accepting (and not behaving) is equally good as the outcome of declining.
This is not an instance of Total Value Splintering because the outcome of ac-
cepting and of declining are equally good. Instead, this is an instance of the following
general structure:
Partial Value Splintering: there is an act A such that wi and wj are
outcomes in which A occurs and wk is an outcome in which ¬A occurs
and wi is strictly better than wk and wk is equally good wj
As the interested reader can verify, if we only have instance of Partial Value Splin-
tering, Left-to-Right fails, but Right-to-Left does not fail. Since I am skeptical
there are any plausible grounds for merely accepting Partial Value Splintering,
I will not explore this more restricted failure of Value Non-Splintering further.
Instead, I conclude that on relatively modest grounds we have located a fault line that
is a kind of intermediate between the depth of cases of deontic constraints and the
shallowness of cases of deontic options.
3 Further Dimensions of Depth
There are further questions we can ask to assess the depth of a fault line. We can
consider what kinds of theories are separated by a fault line and how interesting these
theories are. And we can also consider what kinds cases constitute the fault line and
how interesting these cases are. We spend most of this section considering the first
issue (§3.2-3.4), but close with a brief discussion of the second (§3.5).
As we will see, the cases that illustrate the failures of the principles that we are
discussing separate standard consequentialism from other kinds of value-based theories.




Recall that standard consequentialism is the following claim:
S is obligated to do x iff the outcome of S’s doing x is better than the
outcome of S’s failing to do x
where we say for a possible world, w:
w is the outcome of S’s doing x iff if S were to do x, then w would obtain
Let us look at the basic resources involved in this formulation. It, of course, involves
explaining what is obligatory in terms of value. It also involves the notion of an
outcome. As I have stipulatively defined it an outcome is a possible world (i.e., a
maximally specific way things could be) and it is the possible world that would result
if the agent did the act.
This notion of an outcome is in one way quite broad. It is broad in the sense
that it is very inclusive: the outcome of an act is not merely its causal consequences.
Rather the outcome of an act includes everything that would be the case. This in-
cludes things such as the act itself and events prior to the act. This broad notion of
consequence is often accepted by consequentialist in order to develop the theory in the
most ecumenical way possible.
But in another way, this notion of the outcome of an act involves certain strong
commitments. In particular, it requires that there is a unique maximally specific
way things would be if an agent performed an act. Very roughly, this amounts to a
commitment to the principle of so-called conditional excluded middle (at least where
the antecedent involves claims about what an agent does):
P  Q or P  ¬Q
In the standard semantics for counterfactuals, conditional excluded middle corresponds
to the claim that for any P and any way things could be w, there is a unique closest
possible world to w where P is true. There are ways to relax this assumption if we
like, but we will adopt it for simplicity in what follows.13
The last feature to take note of is that this statement of consequentialism involves
comparing an act’s outcome with the outcome of refraining from doing the act. So
standard consequentialism understands obligations in terms of the value of an outcome
of an act and how it compares to the outcome of refraining from doing that act.
3.2 Generalizing
We can locate this specific way of determining whether an act is obligatory within a
more general set of theoretical options about how values determine whether an act is
obligatory.
13Here is a more general definition of an outcome where an outcome, o, is a proposition (a
set of possible worlds):
o is the outcome of S’s doing x iff o is true at exactly those w such that if S
were to do x, then w might obtain
If this more general characterization is in place, we face further questions. We must ask how
the value of o is related to the value of each w. We do not explore this issue here (though some
of our discussion below indirectly bears on this issue). Though I cannot pursue this here, the
main claims in §A can be shown to hold in this more general setting if we make an additional
assumption: if o1, o2, . . . , on on are cells of a partition of set o, then it is not the case that o
is strictly better than oi for each i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
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First, we can notice that consequentialism determines the deontic status of an
act by considering the value of the possible world that would result if the act were
performed. But we have already observed that there can be an outcome in which an
act occurs that is not itself the outcome of the act. In Zimmerman’s example, there
is an outcome in which one accepts that is not the outcome of one accepting—the
outcome in which one accepts the invitation and behaves well is not the outcome of
accepting the invitation because one would behave poorly if one were to accept the
invitation. Noticing this allows us to see that consequentialism is just one response to
the question of how the deontic states of an act is related to the values of outcomes in
which the act occurs. Table 1 summarizes a variety of positions one can take on this
question. Standard consequentialism is a form of Deontic Actualism. It tethers the
Table 1: How Are the Deontic Statuses of Acts Related to Outcomes in which
the Act Occurs?
Views O(A) iff
Deontic Maximin Possibilism the worst w where A obtains is better
than C
Deontic Maximax Possibilism the best w where A obtains is the
better than C
Deontic Actualism the w that would obtain if A obtained
is better than C
deontic status of an act to the outcome of the act. But the table shows that there
are other ways in which the value of an outcome might determine whether an act is
obligatory.
We have an open parameter C in Table 1. This represents different views about
what the relevant comparison class is for determining whether an act ought to be done.
We saw earlier what standard consequentialism looks at the outcome of not doing A,
but again we can imagine other answers to this question such as the ones mentioned
in Table 2. Better than Alt relies on the notion of alternative which we can define
Table 2: What Comparison Class is Relevant to Determining the Deontic Status
of an Act?
Views The comparison class for A is
Better than Not the outcome(s) relevant to ¬A’s deontic status
Better than Alt the outcome(s) relevant to every alternative to A’s
deontic status
as follows: B is an alternative to A for an agent exactly if A is an act available to the
agent, B is act available to the agent, but the agent is not able to do A ∧ B. It is, of
course, easy to see that neither of these tables exhausts the logical space of options.14
Rather they simple represent a few natural ideas.
14For example, Table 2 is parasitic on what choice a theory makes in Table 1 so that there
is a kind of matching evaluation between A and its comparison class. But another logically
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Different choices about these issues lead to different results concerning the status
of our principles. Let us look at this.
3.3 Some Relations between the Choice Points and Fault
Lines
Let’s begin by assuming, as the standard consequentialist does, that Deontic Actu-
alism is true and consider what if anything is interesting about the choice of between
Better than Not and Better than Alt.
As we have seen, standard consequentialism accepts Deontic Actualism and
Better than Not. And standard consequentialism is incompatible with Inher-
itance, Agglomeration, and No Conflicts. Interestingly, however, the minor
variant of standard consequentialism that accepts Deontic Actualism but adopts
Better than Alt is compatible with and indeed entails Agglomeration and No
Conflicts. The variant of standard consequentialism that accepts Better than
Alt does however share standard consequentialism’s commitment to rejecting Inher-
itance.
Though I leave an informal proof of this to Proposition 4 in §A, we can see why
we do not get a failure of these principles by returning to Zimmerman’s case. There
we saw that standard consequentialism entails that one is obligated to accept the
invitation and behave well because this leads to the best outcome. And we saw that
standard consequentialism entails that it is not the case that one is obligated to accept
because the outcome of this act was worse than the outcome of not accepting. All of
these claims are true according to a variant that accepts Better than Alt rather
than Better than Not as well. Since the outcome of accepting and behaving is the
very best one, it is better than the outcome of every alternative. Since the outcome
of accepting is worse than the outcome of not accepting, the outcome of accepting is
worse than some alternative. Since both views claim that one is obligated to accept
the invitation and behave well and that one is not obligated to accept the invitation,
both reject Inheritance.
But standard consequentialism entails that one is obligated to decline the invitation
because the outcome of declining the invitation is better than the outcome of (not not)
accepting the invitation. This is verdict is what leads to the failure of Agglomeration
because the conjunction of declining the invitation and accepting the invitation and
behaving is not obligatory. And this verdict also leads to the failure of No Conflicts.
But if we adopt Better than Alt, none of these results follow: the fact that
the outcome of declining is better than the outcome of accepting is not sufficient to
establish that one is obligated to decline. Instead, what would need to be shown
is that the outcome of declining is better than the outcome of every alternative to
declining. But it is easy to see that there is an alternative to declining that has a
better outcome. In particular, accepting and behaving is an alternative to decline
accepting that has a better outcome. Thus, Agglomeration and No Conflicts
are fault lines that separate Deontic Actualism paired with Better than Not
(standard consequentialism) from Deontic Actualism paired with Better than
Alt.
possible approach is to use unmatched comparisons. For example, there is a theory that
accepts Deontic Maximax Possibilism with a comparison class to the outcome of ¬A (rather
than compared to the best outcome in which ¬A). Though worthy of further exploration, I
do not consider these unmatched approaches here.
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If we now turn to Deontic Maximin Possibilism when paired with Better than
Not or Better than Alt, we see that this same pattern repeats itself. As Proposition
5 in §A demonstrates, Deontic Maximin Possibilism paired with Better than
Not does not validate Inheritance, Agglomeration, or No Conflicts. But, as
Propoisition 7 in §A shows, Deontic Maximin Possibilism paired with Better
than Alt does validate Agglomeration and No Conflicts even though it does
not validate Inheritance (Proposition 6 in §A)
This repeated pattern suggests the following conjecture: any (reasonable) theory
that accepts Better than Alt validates Agglomeration. To prove this conjecture,
we would need a more systematic grasp of the logical space of reasonable theories.
Since I cannot provide such a systematic account here, I cannot prove this conjecture.
But we have encountered some circumstantial evidence for it.
Corroborating this conjecture further, Deontic Maximax Possibilism paired
with Better than Alt, validates Agglomeration and No Conflicts (as is shown
in Proposition 10 in §A).15 Interestingly, however, Deontic Maximax Possibilism
paired with Better than Alt standouts among the theories in that it validates
Inheritance as well (as is shown in Proposition 9 in the appendix). Finally, if we
turn to Deontic Maximax Possibilism paired with Better than Not, it turns out
to be equivalent to Deontic Maximax Possibilism paired with Better than Alt
(as is shown in Proposition 8 in the appendix)
Thus, it appears Inheritance is a fault line separating Deontic Maximax Pos-
sibilism from the other theories discussed in Table 1 and Agglomeration is a fault
line separating theory that accept Better than Alt from other theories.
3.4 Further Generalizations
Though we do not have the space here to explore these issues in depth, it is worth
pointing out that there are still other important answers to the two questions about
how deontic statuses are determined that we are exploring. If we return to the question
asked in Table 1, there are at least the further options in Table 3 to consider. Deontic
Table 3: Further Options: How Are the Deontic Statuses of Acts Related to
Outcomes in which the Act Occurs?
Views O(A) iff
Deontic Maximin F-ism the worst w that is F and where A obtains is
better than C
Deontic Maximax F-ism the best w that is F and where A obtains is
the better than C
Deontic Averagism some kind of average of the values of the ws
that entail A is greater than C
Maximin Fism and Deontic Maximax F-ism are like their Possibilism counterparts
except that they place some further conditions on what the outcome where A obtains
15The interested reader can also check that the proof strategy for each of these results is
remarkably similar: each proof exploits the fact that ¬A ∧B and A ∧ ¬B are alternatives to
A and B respectively to establish that O(A ∧B) given O(A) and O(B).
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must be like. Some theories in the literature that fit this mold are so-called securantism
(Portmore 2011 and Ross 2012) and maximalism (Portmore 2019). These views in their
Maximax form are typically thought to validate Inheritance, Agglomeration, and
No Conflicts. So in this respect, they pair with their Possibilism counterparts. It
may also be the case that rule consequentialist views (Hooker 2001) can be thought
of as forms of Deontic Maximax F-ism though more care is required to make this
assessment.
Deontic Averagism is view that is most familiar in decision-theoretic contexts.
In standard decision theory, the utility assigned to an act and whether the act ought
to be done is a function of a probabilistically weighted average of the values of the
various outcome in which the act it occurs. It is an interesting question for further
research what properties Deontic Averagism has.
Similarly, there are are least further options in Table 4 concerning comparison
to consider. Better than Threshold corresponds to simplistic forms of satisficing
Table 4: Further Options: What Comparison Class is Relevant to Determining
the Deontic Status of an Act?
Views The comparison class for A is
Better than Threshold the outcome, τ
Better than Context the outcome(s) relevant to the deontic status
of acts supplied by context (speaker,
assessor, etc.)
consequentialism (Slote 1984). And certain kinds of deontic logics that are based on
preferences (Hansson 2001).
It is much harder to evaluate Better than Context without developing a much
richer account of the role of context in determining comparison classes of acts. Luckily,
there is already some important work in the literature about the semantics and logic
of ‘ought’ and related notion that addresses some of these questions.16
This, then, gives us a number of avenues for future research by which we can assess
and evaluate various fault lines and a variety of important theories that determine the
deontic status of act by the value of outcomes.17
3.5 The Principles
Let us close this section by discussing the plausibility of the various principles that I
have mentioned. In deontic logic, these principles are valid in the so-called Standard
Deontic Logic. This is not to say that they are uncontroversial. Far from it. Indeed, the
Standard Deontic Logic is widely rejected for a variety of reasons. I will not rehearse
16The role of context arises in discussion of cases like Zimmerman’s in Jackson and Pargetter
1986. But see Cariani 2013, Cariani 2016, and Snedegar 2017 for contemporary discussion.
17There is a further question as to the relationship between the value of an act and the
value of outcome. Most theorists accept Value Actualism according to which the value of
an act is determined by the value of its outcome. But some authors (e.g., Wedgwood 2009)
do not accept this view.
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the challenges to Standard Deontic Logic here.18 Instead, I will briefly illustrate
the plausibility of these principles by showing how they provide tidy explanations of
mundane facts about what we are obligated to do and of mundane feature of our
ethical thinking. This will provide some (defeasible) evidence for the principle and
show how accepting or rejecting these principle is connected to broader issues.
Begin with Inheritance. This principle is manifest in ordinary forms of reasoning
such as concluding from the fact that you ought to drive less that fifty miles per hour
on a street that ought to refrain from driving fifty-three miles per hour on that street
(cf. Cariani 2013: n. 1). It is also closely related to forms of reasoning about what
means we ought to take to our ends.
Next consider Agglomeration. Suppose one knows that one ought to fight in
the army or perform public service and suppose one also knows that one ought to not
fight in the army. In this setting, it is natural to conclude that one ought to perform
public service (cf. Horty 1993: 73). This inference is not licensed by Inheritance
alone. But if one accepts Agglomeration, it follows from these two claims that one
ought to both fight in the army or perform public service and not fight in the army.
From this and Inheritance, it follows that one ought to perform public service. More
generally, this form of reasoning is closely related to the idea that one should consider
how best to achieve one’s goals taken together rather than separately.
Thus, these principles, though controversial, nicely explain simple facts about obli-
gations and simple features of ethical thought.
4 Conclusion
Let us close by briefly mentioning how the ideas that we have explored here bear on the
topic of consequentializing, the topic of whether (and how) any non-consequentialist
theory can be given a consequentialist interpretation. There is no consensus about
what follows from the fact that a non-consequentialist theory can be given a conse-
quentialist representation. But Jamie Dreier provides one influential answer:
by consequentializing a theory we can keep clearer about what the im-
portant structural differences are among competing moral theories. If
I am right that the consequentialist/nonconsequentialist distinction is a
shallow matter of book-keeping, then consequentializing all competitors
will help shine the light on distinctions that are important, like centered-
ness and perhaps causal versus constitutive connections between act and
consequence, by clearing away the shallow differences (Dreier 2011: 115)
According to Dreier, important differences between ethical theories are really differ-
ences in what contributes to the value of outcomes. I believe the work we have done
here cast significant doubt on Dreier’s idea.19
To see why, consider what Dreier’s idea suggests about the difference between
standard consequentialism and Deontic Maximax Possibilism. According to Dreier,
the difference that these theories have about whether to consider the outcome of
18See McNamara 2019 and especially Hilpinen and McNamara 2014 for synoptic discussions
of Standard Deontic Logic, challenges to various principles including the ones discussed here,
and a broader sense of the state of play in deontic logic.
19It may be that Dreier’s remarks are not intended to apply to the context discussed below.
If so, my remarks are not a direct criticism of his view. That said, I believe that discussion
here provides materials for objecting to the use of his ideas in the context he clearly intends.
See also Hurley, this volume for a distinct criticism of Dreier’s idea.
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A or the best outcome in which A in determining whether an act is obligatory is
not a very important one. Rather, it is better to translate the Deontic Maximax
Possibilism into a standard consequentialist format and consider what theory of value
it is committed to. As we have seen, such a translation would require commitment to
Value Non-Splintering.
Though I have no argument for this, I put it to the reader that this does not
capture what is importantly different between standard consequentialism and Deontic
Maximax Possibilism. It would be uncharitable to assume that anyone believes
Value Non-Splintering. And I see no reason why the matter should not be taken
simply at face value: these theorists can agree about the value of outcomes but disagree
about how the value of various outcomes is relevant for determining the deontic status
of acts.
The lesson may generalize. What many theories disagree about is not the value
of outcomes are but the way the value of outcomes is related to the deontic status of
acts. These are genuine differences that, as we have seen, can correspond to important
general principles.
Thus, I conclude the project of finding and assessing fault lines in ethical theory
suggests that certain strands of thought in the debate about consequentializing are
mistaken. And more generally, I hope that our discussion points the way to new and
interesting questions that may help us to better assess long standing debates in moral
theory.
A Proofs
The proofs in this appendix are somewhat informal and rely on certain assumptions.
We assume throughout that each act has a unique outcome, that the goodness ordering
is a total ordering, that there is always a unique outcome that is better than all other
outcomes, and that
¬O⊥: If A is inconsistent, then ¬O(A) is true
Relaxing these assumptions is beyond the scope of this paper. But for those who
are interested, exploring these issues in a more general setting involves considering
the relation between certain logical principles and certain properties of preference-like
relations. There is excellent work on this topic in the deontic logic tradition.20 But
there is still room for considerable new research.
Before we turn to the proofs of Proposition 1-10, let us restate the key theses
discussed in these claims (sometimes in a form more amenable for the proofs to come):
Inheritance: If A entails B, then O(A) entails O(B)
Agglomeration: O(A) ∧O(B)→ O(A ∧B)
No Conflicts: If O(A1) is true, O(A2) is true , . . . , and O(An) is true,
then {A1, A2, . . . , An} is consistent
Standard Consequentialism: O(A) iff wA is better than w¬A (where
wA is the outcome of doing A; similarly for other acts)
Deontic Actualism + Better than Alt: O(A) iff wA is better than
wB for each B that is an alternative to A
20See especially Goble 1990a, Goble 1990b, Hansson 2001.
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Deontic Maximin Possibilism + Better than Not: O(A) iff w−A is
better than w−¬A (where w
−
A is the worst outcome in which A occurs;
similarly for other acts)
Deontic Maximin Possibilism + Better than Alt: O(A) iff w−A is
better than w−B for each B that is an alternative to A
Deontic Maximax Possibilism + Better than Not: O(A) iff w+A
is better than w+¬A (where w
+
A is the best outcome in which A occurs;
similarly for other acts)
Deontic Maximax Possibilism + Better than Alt: O(A) iff w+A is
better than w+B for each B that is an alternative to A
Value Non-Splintering: if A is true at wi and at wj , then for any wk
where A is false, if wi is strictly better than (/worse than/equally good
as) wk, then wj is better than (/worse than/equally good as) wk (where
wi, wj , wk are outcomes)
We now can prove each of the claims from the main text.
Proposition 1. Standard Consequentialism and Value Non-Splintering entail
Inheritance
Proof. Suppose A entails B and O(A). Since O(A), Standard Consequentialism
entails wA is better than w¬A. Since A entails B, B is true at wA. By Value-Non-
Splintering, wB is better than w¬A.
Suppose further that ¬O(B). Standard Consequentialism entails wB is not
better than w¬B (i.e., wB is equally good or worse than w¬B). Since A entails B, ¬A
is true at w¬B . By Value Non-Splintering, wB is not better than w¬A (i.e., wB is
equally good or worse than w¬A). Contradiction.
Thus, O(B) must be true so Inheritance holds.
Proposition 2. Standard Consequentialism and Value Non-Splintering entail
Agglomeration
Proof. Suppose O(A) and O(B). By Standard Consequentialism, wA is better
than w¬A and wB is better than w¬B , Since A and B are both true at w(A∧B), Value
Non-Splintering entails that w(A∧B) is better than w¬A and w(A∧B) is better than
w¬B .
Suppose further ¬O(A ∧ B). By Standard Consequentialism, w(A∧B) is not
better than w¬(A∧B) (i.e, w(A∧B) is either equally good or worse than w¬(A∧B)).
Now either (i) ¬A is true at w¬(A∧B) or (ii) ¬B is true at w¬(A∧B). Suppose (i).
Then by Value Non-Splintering, w(A∧B) is not better than w¬A. Contradiction.
Suppose instead (ii). Then by Value Non-Splintering w(A∧B) is not better than
w¬B . Contradiction.
Thus, O(A ∧B) must be true so Agglomeration holds.
Proposition 3. Standard Consequentialism and Value Non-Splintering entail
No Conflicts
Proof. Assume O(A1), O(A2), . . . , O(An) are true but {A1, A2, . . . , An} is inconsis-
tent. By Proposition 2 and O(A1), O(A2), . . . , O(An) , O(A1∧A2∧· · ·∧An). But given
¬O⊥ and the assumption that {A1, A2, . . . , An} is inconsistent, ¬O(A1∧A2∧· · ·∧An).
Contradiction.
Thus, No Conflicts holds.
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Proposition 4. Deontic Actualism + Better than Alt entails Agglomera-
tion
Proof. Suppose O(A) and O(B) but ¬O(A ∧ B). Given Deontic Actualism +
Better than Alt, there is some act C that is an alternative to A ∧ B such that
w(A∧B) is not better than wC . Since C is an alternative to A ∧ B , it follows either
that (i) ¬A ∧ C is true at wC or that (ii) ¬B ∧ C is true at wC .
Suppose (i).Then since wC is one where ¬A ∧ C is true, w(¬A∧C) = wC .21 Since
O(A) and ¬A∧C is an alternative to A, Deontic Actualism + Better than Alt
entail wA is better than w(¬A∧C) = wC . Now either A ∧B is true at wA or it is not.
Suppose A ∧ B is true at wA. It follows that wA = w(A∧B) so w(A∧B) is better
than wC . This contradicts our earlier claim that w(A∧B) is not better than wC .
Suppose instead A∧B is not true at wA. It follows w(A∧¬B) = wA. Since A∧¬B
is an alternative to B and O(B), Deontic Actualism + Better than Alt entails
wB is better than w(A∧¬B) = wA. Either A ∧ B is true at wB or it isn’t. If it is,
then wB = w(A∧B) and so w(A∧B) is better than wA which is better than wC .This
contradicts the assumption that w(A∧B) is not better than wC . So it must be that
A ∧ B is false at wB . So wB = w(¬A∧B). Since ¬A ∧ B is an alternative to A and
O(A), Deontic Actualism + Better than Alt, wA is better than w(¬A∧B) = wB
which contradicts our assumption that wB is better than w(A∧¬B) = wA. Thus (i)
cannot hold.
Suppose instead, then that (ii) holds. Analogous reasoning shows that (ii) cannot
be true.
Thus, Agglomeration holds.
Corollary 4.1. Deontic Actualism + Better than Alt entails No Conflicts
Proof. Since we have established Proposition 4, No Conflicts also holds for reasons
analogous to those given in Proposition 3
Proposition 5. Deontic Maximin Possibilism + Better than Not does not
validate Inheritance, Agglomeration, or No Conflicts
A counter model. Consider a four world model where the numbers represent the value
of each world:
w(A∧B): 100 w(A∧¬B): 25
w(¬A∧B): 50 w(¬A∧¬B): 50
Since w−(A∧B) is better than w
−
¬(A∧B), Deontic Maximin Possibilism + Better
than Not entails O(A ∧ B). But w−A is not better than w
−
¬A, so Deontic Maximin
Possibilism + Better than Not entails ¬O(A). Thus, Inheritance does not hold.
Furthermore, since w−¬A is better than w
−
A , Deontic Maximin Possibilism +
Better than Not entails O(¬A). We have already seen that O(A¬B). Since {A ∧
B,¬A} is inconsistent, No Conflicts does not hold.
Finally, given ¬O⊥, ¬O(A ∧B ∧ ¬A). Thus, Agglomeration does not hold.
Proposition 6. Deontic Maximin Possibilism + Better than Alt does not
validate Inheritance
21This claim is justified by the assumption that if P  Q and P  R, then P ∧Q R
and the assumption that if P and Q are logically equivalent, then P  R iff Q R. These
same assumptions are used in a number of other places in this proof.
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A counter model. Consider the same model as the one given for Proposition 5.
w−(A∧B) is better than all worlds, so w
−
(A∧B) is better than w
−
C for any C that is an
alternative to A ∧ B. So by Deontic Maximin Possibilism + Better than Alt,
O(A ∧B).
But once again w−A is not better than w
−
¬A and ¬A is an alternative to A, so Deon-
tic Maximin Possibilism + Better than Alt entails ¬O(A). Thus, Inheritance
does not hold.
Proposition 7. Deontic Maximin Possibilism + Better than Alt entails Ag-
glomeration
Proof. We begin with a lemma.
Lemma 7.1. Deontic Maximin Possibilism + Better than Alt entails that if
O(A) and O(B), then either A entails B or B entails A.
Proof of lemma. Suppose A does not entail B and B does not entail A. Then there is
a w−(¬A∧B) and there is a w
−
(A∧¬B).
Suppose O(A) and O(B). By Deontic Maximin Possibilism + Better than
Alt and the fact that ¬A∧B is an alternative to A, w−A is better than w
−
(¬A∧B). And
similarly, w−B is better than w
−
(A∧¬B).




(A∧¬B) is better than w
−
(¬A∧B). And
similarly, w−(¬A∧B) is better than w
−
(A∧¬B). This is a contradiction and so proves the
Lemma.
We now return to the main proof. Suppose O(A) and O(B), but ¬O(A∧B). Given
Deontic Maximin Possibilism + Better than Alt, there is an alternative C to
A ∧B such that w−(A∧B) is not better than w
−
C .
By Lemma A either A entails B or B entails A. Suppose A entails B so A and
A ∧ B are equivalents and so every alternative to A is an alternative to A ∧ B and
vice-versa and w−A = w
−
(A∧B). Since O(A), Deontic Maximin Possibilism + Better
than Alt entails that w−A is better than w
−
C for any C that is an alternative to A.
Thus, w−(A∧B) is better than w
−
C for any C that is an alternative to A ∧ B. This is a
contradiction.
So suppose B entails A. Analogous reasoning shows we reach a contradiction.
Thus, Agglomeration holds.
Corollary 7.1. Deontic Maximin Possibilism + Better than Alt entails No
Conflicts
Proof. Since we have established Proposition 7, No Conflicts also holds for reasons
analogous to those given in Proposition 3
Proposition 8. Deontic Maximax Possibilism + Better than Alt and Deon-
tic Maximin Possibilism + Better than Not give equivalent verdicts about what
is obligatory
Proof. This claim trivially follows from Lemma 8.1 and Lemma 8.2 below.
Lemma 8.1. If O(A) is true according to Deontic Maximax Possibilism + Better
than Alt, then O(A) is true according Deontic Maximin Possibilism + Better
than Not
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Proof. Suppose O(A) is true according to Deontic Maximax Possibilism + Better
than Alt. Thus, w+A is better than w
+
C for every alternative C to A. ¬A is an
alternative to A. Thus w+A is better than w
+
¬A is true. So according to Deontic
Maximax Possibilism + Better than Not, O(A) is true.
Lemma 8.2. If O(A) is true according to Deontic Maximax Possibilism + Better
than Not, then O(A) is true according to Deontic Maximin Possibilism + Better
than Alt
Proof. Suppose O(A) is true according to Deontic Maximax Possibilism + Better
than Not. Thus w+A is better than w
+
¬A. Now for any w
+
C such that C is an alternative
to A, ¬A is true at w+C . So w
+
¬A is at least as good as w
+
C . Thus for any alternative
C to A, w+A is better than w
+
C . So according to Deontic Maximax Possibilism +
Better than Alt, O(A) is true.
Proposition 9. Deontic Maximax Possibilism + Better than Alt entails In-
heritance
Proof. Suppose A entails B and O(A). By Deontic Maximax Possibilism + Bet-
ter than Alt, w+A is better than w
+
C for any alternative C to A. Since A entails B,
B is true at w+A . Therefore w
+
B is at least as good as w
+
A . Next if C
′ is an alternative
to B, C′ is an alternative to A since A entails B. Thus, w+A is better than w
+
C′ for




B is better than w
+
C′
for any alternative C′ to B. So by Deontic Maximax Possibilism + Better than
Alt, O(B). Therefore, Inheritance holds.
Proposition 10. Deontic Maximax Possibilism + Better than Alt entails
Agglomeration
Proof. We begin with a lemma.
Lemma 10.1. Deontic Maximax Possibilism + Better than Alt entails that if





Proof of lemma. Assume O(A) and O(B). Given Deontic Maximax Possibilism
+ Better than Alt and O(A), w+A is better than w
+
C for any alternative C to A.
Either A ∧B is true at w+A or it isn’t. If A ∧B is true at w
+










w+(A∧¬B). Since A ∧ ¬B is an alternative to B and O(B), Deontic Maximax Pos-





either A is true at w+B or it isn’t.
Suppose A is true at w+B . It follows that since w
+










Suppose then A is false and so w+(¬A∧B) = w
+
B . Since ¬A ∧ B is an alternative to
A and since w+(¬A∧B) = w
+
B is better than w
+
A . So Deontic Maximax Possibilism +
Better than Alt entails ¬O(A) which contradicts our assumption that O(A). So





Next, given Deontic Maximax Possibilism + Better than Alt and O(B), w+B
is better than w+C for any alternative C to B. Either A ∧ B is true at w
+
B or it isn’t.











We return now to the main proof. Suppose O(A) and O(B), but ¬O(A ∧ B).
By Deontic Maximax Possibilism + Better than Alt, there is C that is an
alternative to A∧B such that w+(A∧B) is not better than w
+
C . Since C is an alternative
to A ∧B, either (i) ¬A ∧ C is true at w+C or (ii) ¬B ∧ C is true at w
+
C .
Suppose (i). So w+C = w
+
(¬A∧C). Given O(A) and the fact that ¬A ∧ C is an
alternative to A, Deontic Maximax Possibilism + Better than Alt entails that
w+A is better than w
+
( ¬A ∧ C) = w
+







is better than w+(¬A∧C) = w
+
C . This contradicts our earlier claim that w
+
(A∧B) is not
better than w+C . So (i) must be false.
Suppose (ii). Analogous reasoning establishes that (ii) must be false.
Thus, Agglomeration holds.
Corollary 10.1. Deontic Maximax Possibilism + Better than Alt entails No
Conflicts
Proof. Since we have established Proposition 10, No Conflicts also holds for reasons
analogous to those given in Proposition 3
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